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I. Introduction 
In a forthcoming article in the Washington and Lee Law 
Review,1 Gregory Dolin and Irina Manta argue that the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA),2 the cornerstone of modern 
patent reform, effectuates a “taking” within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment by depriving patent owners of the economic 
value of their patents without compensating them for these 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Fellow at the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School and Visiting Fellow at the Information 
Society Project, Yale Law School. 
 ∗∗ J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Yale Law School and Student Fellow at 
the Information Society Project, Yale Law School. Thanks to Dmitry Karshtedt 
for helpful comments and to Boris Bindman, Emily Tichenor, and the other 
members of the Washington and Lee Law Review for exceptional editing. All 
errors are ours.   
 1. Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125 
Stat. 284, 299–311, 329–31 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 
321–29, 321 note (2012)). 
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losses.3 Specifically, they contend, the AIA’s creation of inter 
partes review (IPR) and covered business method review (CBMR) 
proceedings significantly interfered with patentees’ “reasonable 
investment-backed expectations” by increasing the likelihood that 
their patents would be found invalid.4 As evidence, the authors 
point to high invalidation rates in IPR and CBMR proceedings5 
and the strong negative effect of some IPR filings on patentees’ 
stock prices. According to their theory, “a mere IPR 
request . . . has significant effects on the underlying value of the 
patent and even on the price of the stock of the company that 
owns the patent.”6  
Dolin and Manta’s article is a provocative invitation to 
consider Congress’s constitutional authority to pass legislation 
that decreases the value of issued patents. While the precise 
contours of this authority are unclear, we are ultimately 
unpersuaded that the AIA effectuates a taking. First, the authors’ 
premise that patents are property rights protected by the Takings 
Clause is far less clear than they contend. Although we agree that 
                                                                                                     
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4.  Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 65–66). CBMR is itself a 
variation of post-grant review (PGR), a third type of proceeding created by the 
AIA. For discussion of Dolin and Manta’s arguments regarding the differences 
between AIA’s post-issuance proceedings and other administrative proceedings 
for challenging patent validity, see infra Part IV. 
 5.  The new IPR and CBMR proceedings have a higher invalidation rate 
than either litigation or pre-AIA proceedings. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 31–36); see also Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. 
L. REV. 881, 924–27 (2015). For current statistics on IPRs and CBMRs, see 
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 
29, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-
29%20PTAB.pdf. 
 6.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 60, 31–36). The 
authors also cite the opinion of Richard Baker, President of New England 
Intellectual Property, LLC, who estimates that “because of the AIA” the value of 
patents has dropped by two thirds, “with a further drop of 10-15% expected in 
the next few years.” Id. (manuscript at 64–65) (citing Richard Baker, America 
Invents Act Cost the US Economy over $1 Trillion, PATENTLY-O (June 8, 
2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html). Many 
might balk at such estimates and remain skeptical of Dolin and Manta’s 
contention that the procedures adopted by the AIA have had, and will continue 
to have, “a serious effect on the value of patents to their owners.” Dolin & 
Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5). Nevertheless, given the difficulty of 
assessing the authors’ empirical claims, we concentrate instead on the legal 
aspects of their argument. 
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this proposition is theoretically and legally defensible, the 
relevant precedents are hardly decisive.  
Second, courts are unlikely to view IPR and CBMR 
proceedings as the kinds of government actions governed by the 
Takings Clause. Courts assessing constitutional challenges under 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment tend to distinguish actions 
intended to cure defects in government administrative systems 
from incursions on property rights. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
rejected a challenge to IPR’s predecessor based partly on this 
distinction. We see little reason that a court would reach a 
different conclusion today. 
Third, Dolin and Manta arguably overstate the extent to 
which the AIA affected patentees’ investment-backed 
expectations. As they acknowledge, the AIA was enacted against 
a background of federal statutes and regulations that authorize 
challenges to patent validity, both through administrative review 
and through litigation, or otherwise limit patentees’ ability to 
exploit patents and patented inventions. These laws, like the 
AIA, affected the value of issued patents. Within this 
environment, patentees could arguably foresee that the 
government would continue to actively regulate patent rights.  
Together, these arguments persuade us that the AIA does 
not effectuate a taking. Nevertheless, Dolin and Manta’s analysis 
offers an engaging and important discussion on the constitutional 
implications of patent reform. 
II. Patents’ Uncertain Status Under the Takings Clause 
Whether the AIA effectuated a taking depends on whether 
patents are “property” for purposes of the Takings Clause. As 
Dolin and Manta acknowledge, the question is the object of 
intense scholarly debate.7 Nevertheless, they conclude, “Judicial 
precedent and statutory analysis quite clearly support the 
proposition that patents are property.”8 We believe that this 
                                                                                                     
 7.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 49–51).  
 8. Id. (manuscript at 51) (quoting Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) 
and the Unconstitutional Taking of Property, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2010)). 
Dolin and Manta’s analysis of precedent tracks Joshua Miller’s analysis of the 
history of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which grants the Court of Federal Claims 
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proposition is defensible but disagree that it is clearly 
established. 
The Fifth Amendment unquestionably protects patents. The 
scope of that protection is, however, unclear. The Supreme Court 
has explained that patents are protected “property” under the 
Due Process Clause. But in contrast with trade secrets,9 the 
Court has never held that patents are property under the 
Takings Clause. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education 
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,10 the Court stated that 
patents are “surely included within the ‘property’ of which no 
person may be deprived by a State without due process of law.”11 
Nevertheless, the Court declined to rule on patents’ status under 
the Takings Clause. In that case, College Savings Bank argued 
that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act,12 which purported to abrogate states’ sovereign 
immunity to patent infringement liability, was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers because state patent 
infringement constituted an uncompensated taking.13 The Court 
withheld judgment, holding instead that the Act was not 
intended to remedy takings violations.14 The Court neither 
accepted nor rejected the possibility that government 
infringement could constitute a taking.15 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction to hear claims for patent infringement against the United States 
and its contractors. 
 9.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984). 
 10. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  
 11.  Id. at 642. 
 12.  35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (2012).  
 13. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.  at 641–42. 
 14.  See id. at 641–42 & n.7. 
 15.  See id. The view that patents are protected under the Due Process 
Clause but not the Takings Clause has some support in the Supreme Court’s 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. As Davida Isaacs argues, the Court’s modern 
precedents distinguish between federally created benefits, protected by the Due 
Process Clause, and other forms of property protected by the Takings Clause. 
Like the government benefits at issue in these cases, patents are federal 
creations and are arguably entitled to the former’s narrower protections. See 
Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist 
Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right To Do So, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 36–41 (2007) (citing Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587 
(1987); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
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Dolin and Manta argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Horne v. Department of Agriculture16 “left no doubt” that 
“patents are subject to the Takings Clause.”17 We disagree. In 
Horne, the Court held that the government could not order raisin 
growers to set aside a certain percentage of their crop without 
receiving just compensation.18 To support its conclusion that the 
Takings Clause protects real and personal property equally, the 
Court quoted language from James v. Campbell,19 a 
nineteenth-century decision in which the Court compared 
government appropriation of patents to appropriation of real 
property: 
[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in 
the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used 
by the government itself, without just compensation, any more 
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land 
which has been patented to a private purchaser.20 
Superficially, Horne endorses Dolin and Manta’s assessment 
that patents are property under the Takings Clause. Horne’s 
precedential status, however, is doubtful. First, Horne’s 
discussion of patents and real property is not controlling; the 
discussion was neither essential to the Court’s holding nor briefed 
or argued by the parties.21 Second, James, the source of this 
comparison, itself has extremely limited precedential value. 
James’s discussion of patent takings was dicta,22 and twelve 
                                                                                                     
 16.  135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).  
 17. Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 52). 
 18. See Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427; see also Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 47).    
 19.  104 U.S. 356 (1882).  
 20.  Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358 
(alterations in original)). 
 21.  See Brief for Petitioners, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275); Brief for 
the Respondent, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Horne, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (No. 14-275). 
 22.  Adam Mossoff, who has discussed nineteenth-century takings law cases 
at length, observes that even though the Supreme Court’s statement in James 
was dicta, the lower court’s opinion had held in favor of the patentee against the 
government based on the Takings Clause. See Adam Mossoff, Patents as 
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the 
Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 697, 709 (2007). Specifically, the lower 
court held that the government was not immune from suit for patent 
infringement based on sovereign immunity because a patent, “like all other 
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years later, in Schillinger v. United States,23 the Supreme Court 
cast doubt on James’s conclusion that patents “cannot be 
appropriated or used by the government . . . without just 
compensation.”24  
In Schillinger, the Court held that the Court of Claims did 
not have jurisdiction to hear a claim against the government for 
patent infringement.25 At that time, the court’s jurisdictional 
statute authorized the court to hear “claims founded upon the 
constitution” but not those “sounding in tort.”26 Accordingly, the 
Court held that the patentee could not recover. Justice Harlan 
dissented, citing James’s statement that a patented invention 
“cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without 
just compensation”27—but to no avail.  
Subsequently, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States,28 the Federal 
Circuit held that a patentee could not bring an action in the 
Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Claims’s successor, alleging 
that the government’s infringement of a patent constituted a 
Fifth Amendment taking.29 Between Schillinger and Zoltek, 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which authorizes the Court of 
Federal Claims to hear claims for patent infringement against 
                                                                                                     
private property recognized by law, [was] exempt from being taken for public 
use without just compensations, by the supreme law of the land.” Campbell v. 
James, 4 F. Cas. 1168, 1172 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,361). Thereafter, the 
government prevailed by convincing the Supreme Court that the patent was 
invalid. See James, 104 U.S. at 382–83. More broadly, Mossoff documents that, 
even if the Supreme Court has not held unequivocally that government patent 
takings are compensable under the Takings Clause, some courts in the 
nineteenth century appeared quite comfortable with the notion that patents 
could be taken like other forms of property. See Mossoff, supra, at 719 (citing 
several nineteenth-century federal cases, including McKeever v. United States, 
14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878), and the lower court’s decision in Campbell, applying 
traditional property reasoning to patents and concluding that patentees should 
have the right to sue under the Takings Clause if the federal government made 
an unauthorized use of a patented invention).   
 23.  155 U.S. 163 (1894).  
 24.  Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Campbell, 104 U.S. at 358).  
 25.  See id. at 167–70.  
 26.  Id. at 167 (quoting Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505). 
 27.  Id. at 173. 
 28.  442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacated, 672 F.3d 1309, 
1314–22 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).  
 29.  See id. at 1353.  
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the federal government and its contractors.30 Citing Schillinger’s 
rule that an action for patent infringement sounds in tort, the 
court held that § 1498 provided the only means of recovery and 
that the patentee could not bring its claim under the Takings 
Clause.31 Given the Supreme Court’s decision not to review 
Zoltek,32 we believe it unlikely that Horne overruled Schillinger 
sub silentio. 
Of course, as Dolin and Manta argue, Schillinger and Zoltek 
are not decisive. First, the Federal Circuit subsequently vacated 
its Zoltek decision on other grounds, and the court’s revised 
opinion declined to reach the question of the United States’s 
liability for patent infringement under the Takings Clause.33 
Second, these cases do not necessarily establish that patents can 
never be subject to takings. As Dolin and Manta put it, “The rule 
of law announced in [Schillinger and Zoltek] is simply not that 
broad.”34 Although those cases might govern government 
infringement of patent rights, other, more “drastic” adjustments 
of patent rights might qualify.35  
                                                                                                     
 30.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012) 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the 
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States 
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right . . . the owner’s 
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United 
States Court of Federal Claims for . . . reasonable and entire 
compensation. 
For a brief history of § 1498 and its predecessor, see Sean M. O’Connor, Taking, 
Tort, or Crown Right? The Confused Early History of Government Patent Policy, 
12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 183–98 (2012). 
 31.  See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1350–53. 
 32.  Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1113 (2007). 
 33.  The Federal Circuit’s original decision held that § 1498 only applied to 
government actions that would create liability for direct infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a). See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1360. The court subsequently concluded 
that this holding was erroneous and that § 1498 also applied to actions 
equivalent to indirect liability under § 271(g). See Zoltek, 672 F.3d at 1314–22. 
Accordingly, the court determined that the patentee’s complaint stated a claim 
under § 1498. See id. at 1323–26. The court decided that it was unnecessary to 
address whether the patentee could bring a claim under the Takings Clause. See 
id. at 1327. 
 34.  Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 53). 
 35.  Id. (manuscript at 53–54). Nevertheless, if patents are categorically not 
property under the Takings Clause, as some readings of Schillinger and Zoltek 
might suggest, the extent to which the government action affects patent values 
might be irrelevant.  
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Indeed, on the scale of government intrusions on patentees’ 
rights, infringement is arguably not the most severe. Government 
infringement effectively creates a compulsory license for the 
government, and “all the other attributes of ownership” remain 
“with the patentee.”36 In contrast, Dolin and Manta write, the 
AIA “changed the scope of patent rights themselves” by 
subjecting issued patents to more stringent forms of adversarial 
post-issuance review and significantly reducing the value of those 
patents.37 In theory, this might effectuate a taking that, absent 
just compensation, is unconstitutional.38  
III. Takings Versus “Curative Statutes” 
Furthermore, even if patents are property rights under the 
Takings Clause,39 courts are unlikely to view IPR and CBMR 
proceedings as the kind of government actions that the Clause 
governs. The authors cite no precedent for the conclusion that a 
government action designed to ensure the validity of property 
rights, intangible or otherwise, can constitute a taking.40 Is such 
an action a taking? Or does it merely ensure that property 
boundaries are accurate? In Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,41 the 
Federal Circuit suggested the latter.42 
In Patlex, the Federal Circuit rejected a Fifth Amendment 
challenge to the ex parte reexamination statute.43 The Bayh–Dole 
                                                                                                     
 36.  Id. (manuscript at 55).  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. Dolin and Manta also suggest that the AIA may be a taking 
under a breach of implied contract theory. Patents, they argue, are commonly 
conceived as a contract between the patentee and the government in which the 
government grants a patent in exchange for disclosure of the patented 
invention. Id. (manuscript at 54). This argument is doubtful, however. Courts 
have only invoked implied contract as an analogy for describing the purpose of 
the patent system, not as a legal theory. Further, Schillinger and Zoltek suggest 
that an infringement claim against the government, at least, necessarily sounds 
in tort and is not compensable as a taking. 
 39.  See supra Part II. 
 40.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 62). 
 41.  758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 42.  See id. at 602–03.  
 43.  See id. at 603. Patlex styled its claim as a Takings Clause challenge. 
See id. at 600–03. As explained below, however, the court treated that claim 
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Act established procedures that parties could use to challenge the 
validity of issued patents, including those issued before the Act 
was enacted.44 The plaintiff argued that the Act’s retroactive 
application unfairly encroached on constitutionally protected 
patent rights.45 The court disagreed, holding that the “overriding 
public purposes Congress articulated in enacting the 
reexamination law with retroactive effect” outweighed any 
“hardship” suffered by the patentee.46 
Dolin and Manta dismiss Patlex for two reasons. First, they 
note, the Federal Circuit’s decision turned on Congress’s “public 
purposes” for enacting the reexamination statute.47 The Supreme 
Court subsequently clarified, however, that this approach is only 
proper under the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.48 
Second, they argue IPR and CBMR proceedings “are 
fundamentally different” from the ex parte reexamination system 
at issue in Patlex.49 
As we explain below, we doubt that the differences between 
IPR and CBMR and reexamination proceedings are significant 
enough to make a constitutional difference.50 Moreover, Patlex 
presents a fundamental difficulty for Dolin and Manta’s 
argument, despite the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the 
“public purposes” approach, because it casts doubt on the 
conclusion that post-issuance review proceedings can constitute a 
taking at all. In Patlex, the court explained that the 
reexamination statute belonged to “the class of ‘curative’ statutes, 
designed to cure defects in an administrative system.”51 The court 
                                                                                                     
much as a modern court would treat a claim brought under the Due Process 
Clause. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015–17 
(1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–07 (2012)). 
 45.  See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 596 (“The issue is whether [the retroactive 
effect] of the patent reexamination statute and implementing regulations are in 
violation of [several constitutional provisions].”). For the contentious history of 
the first reexamination procedure, see Dolin, supra note 6, at 899–902. 
 46.  Patlex, 758 F.2d at 602–03. 
 47.  See Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 57–58). 
 48.  See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532, 540–45 (2005). 
 49.  Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 58).  
 50.  Infra Part IV.  
 51.  Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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noted that other courts have treated curative statutes favorably, 
even when applied retroactively.52  
IPR and CBMR proceedings likewise fall into this class of 
curative statutes that simply do not seem like the subject matter 
of a Fifth Amendment taking. Far from depriving patentees of 
vested rights for some public use, IPR and CBMR proceedings 
ensure that patents issued by the government to private parties 
are valid.53 Thus, while Patlex’s references to “public purposes” 
might seem anachronistic, its analysis of the reexamination 
statute reveals the conceptual difficulty that a Takings Clause 
challenge to the AIA will likely face. 
IV. Patentees’ Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
Finally, assuming Dolin and Manta’s argument survives the 
objections described above, it would arguably still fail as a matter 
of takings doctrine. To determine whether a particular 
governmental action effectuates a taking, courts assess “the 
character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”54 
Thus, even assuming a government action has a significant 
                                                                                                     
 52.  See id. at 603 
Where the asserted vested right, not being linked to any substantial 
equity, arises from the mistake of officers purporting to administer 
the law in the name of the Government, the legislature is not 
prevented from curing the defect in administration simply because 
the effect may be to destroy causes of action which would otherwise 
exist.” (citing Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 429 (1931); 
 see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“Like reissuance, ex parte reexamination is a curative proceeding meant 
to correct or eliminate erroneously granted patents.” (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 
852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))). 
 53.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45–47 (2011) (describing the 
purposes of IPR and comparing IPR to inter partes reexamination).  
 54.  See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978). For the purposes of this analysis, we put aside Dolin and Manta’s 
suggestion that the AIA effected a physical taking. See Dolin & Manta, supra 
note 1 (manuscript at 62–64). Unlike the authors’ physical taking claim, their 
regulatory taking claim does not rely on untested analogies between the 
“physical” invasion of tangible and intangible property boundaries. See id. 
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economic impact on protectable property,55 whether this 
constitutes a taking depends on whether the affected party 
should have expected that the action would occur—which, in 
turn, depends on how sharply the action diverges from the 
regulatory background. The Supreme Court has explained that, 
at least in some circumstances involving personal property, 
affected parties “ought to be aware of the possibility that new 
regulation might even render [that] property economically 
worthless.”56  
Given these principles, it does not seem that the AIA 
disrupted reasonable patentees’ expectations. The AIA is only the 
latest in a series of administrative procedures authorizing parties 
to offensively challenge the validity of issued patents. Congress 
gave the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) authority to 
perform post-issuance reexamination of issued patents over thirty 
years ago and has made adjustments to this system ever since. 
Specifically, Congress created ex parte reexamination in 1980, 
the inter partes reexamination (the predecessor of IPR and 
CBMR) in 1999, and IPR, PGR, and CBMR in 2011.57  
Inter partes reexamination is the most important of these 
precedents because, like IPR and CBMR, it was adversarial, 
allowing for participation of the third party challenger in the 
                                                                                                     
     55. As noted above, many might dispute the authors’ contention that the 
AIA reduced the value of patents by changing the procedures for post-issuance 
review. See supra note 6. Some have argued that the challengers to the new IPR 
procedures in Cuozzo, discussed below, lack standing because they cannot show 
use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard caused a redressable 
injury. See Brief of Public Knowledge as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 26–28, In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 
(2016) (No. 15-446). 
 56.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (holding that 
“the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property [in this case, the 
parts of protected endangered birds legally killed before the birds came under 
the protection of federal statutes] does not effect a taking in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment” (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1979))). 
 57.  Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125 
Stat. 284, 299–311, 329–31 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 
321–29 (2012)); Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 4601–08, 113 Stat. 1501A-567–1501A-572 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2000)); Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015–17 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–07 
(2012)). 
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process. Dolin and Manta offer several grounds for distinguishing 
IPR and CBMR from inter partes reexamination. First, the AIA 
requires the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the PTO’s 
administrative tribunal, to use a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard when assessing validity, rather than the more 
deferential “clear and convincing evidence” standard.58 Second, 
the PTAB uses the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard 
to construe patents in IPR and CBMR proceedings; but, unlike 
the prior ex partes reexamination system, the AIA offers 
patentees only “limited” opportunity for amendment.59  
In our view, neither of these distinctions is significant 
enough to make a constitutional difference. The first distinction—
the use of a higher standard of review—is illusory. The PTO 
already applied the “preponderance of the evidence” standard 
when assessing patent validity in reexamination proceedings. 
This should not, on its own, have been surprising.60 The second 
distinction—the use of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” 
standard without significant opportunity to amend—is more 
compelling, especially when combined with the PTAB’s less 
deferential standard of review. As a whole, this represents a 
combination of patent examination and adversarial procedures 
that might potentially have surprised some patentees.   
But this, too, is ultimately unpersuasive. In In re Cuozzo 
Speed Technologies, LLC,61 where patentees recently challenged 
the PTO’s authority to use the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” standard in the new IPRs, the Federal Circuit 
conceded that, under the PTO’s interpretation of the AIA, 
patentees’ opportunity to amend their claims was “much more 
cabined.” But the court went on to hold that the AIA’s “restriction 
on amendment opportunities” did not “materially distingui[sh] 
IPR proceedings from their predecessors in the patent statute,”62 
                                                                                                     
 58.  Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21). 
 59.  Id. (manuscript at 29–31, 58–61). 
 60. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 855–59 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
 61.  793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 62.  Id. at 1277 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1)–(2) (2012)). Additionally, Dolin 
and Manta’s characterization of ex parte reexamination as “not a substitute for 
litigation,” Dolin & Manta, supra note 1 (manuscript at 58), is dubious given the 
reexamination statute’s legislative history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1397, at 3 
(1980) (“Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the 
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and that its prior decisions regarding the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” standard only required amendment to be 
available, not that opportunities to amend be especially liberal.63 
Without taking a position on whether Cuozzo was correctly 
decided, it seems highly unlikely that the Takings Clause’s 
application to administrative patent proceedings could turn on 
such minute differences in amendment procedures.64  
To determine patentees’ reasonable expectations, courts must 
also examine the broader context, to determine whether affected 
parties “ought to be aware” that “new regulation” might render 
their “property economically worthless.”65  
Beyond third party challenges to patent validity, numerous 
federal regulatory statutes limit patentees’ ability to exploit their 
inventions. For example, various regulatory review statutes, such 
as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),66 the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),67 and the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),68 practically reduce the 
effective lifetimes of patents by prohibiting patentees from 
commercially marketing or using protected products during the 
review period.69 Yet none of these statutes fully compensate 
patentees for these losses.70  
                                                                                                     
validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy 
infringement litigation.”). 
 63.  Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1277, n.7. 
 64.  To be sure, Dolin and Manta are correct to point out the controversial 
nature of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard. See Dolin & Manta, 
supra note 1 (manuscript at 23–25, 29–31). The Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in Cuozzo to determine whether the PTO should be required to use the 
“ordinary and customary meaning” standard used by courts during claim 
construction. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 
15-446). Even if the PTO is wrong to apply the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” standard, however, in our view, administrative law, not 
constitutional law, provides the best justification for rejecting the PTO’s 
position. 
 65.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 66.  Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052–53 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)). 
 67.  Pub. L. No. 61-152, § 3, 36 Stat. 331, 331–32 (1910) (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2012)). 
 68.  Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 5, 90 Stat. 2003, 2012–20 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2012)). 
 69.  For example, a drug manufacturer that owns several patents on a new 
drug must nevertheless wait until the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
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Against this backdrop of uncompensated regulatory 
devaluations of patents, it seems the AIA’s adoption of stricter 
post-issuance review proceedings was in accordance with 
patentees’ reasonable expectations.  
Of course, Dolin and Manta might conclude that these other 
examples are also takings. But this conclusion has troubling 
consequences. Does Congress really need to compensate 
patentees every time it passes a statute that significantly affects 
the value of issued patents? Could Congress pass regulations for 
the purpose of restraining bad-faith enforcement of patents that 
have already been granted?71 What about judicial actions that 
reduce the value of patents?72 Do they intend for Congress to 
compensate patentees in these cases or to take fewer actions 
limiting patent rights, simply due to the fear of effectuating a 
taking? This seems like a dangerous basis on which to formulate 
patent policy. 
V. Conclusion 
Ultimately, we believe a Takings Clause challenge to the AIA 
would fail. Arguments over the AIA’s ultimate economic impact 
                                                                                                     
approves its New Drug Application before selling that drug. 
 70.  For instance, between the enactment of the FDCA in 1938 and the 
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman Act) 
in 1984, drug manufacturers received no compensation for diminutions in 
effective patent lifetime caused by the FDA’s approval process. After Hatch–
Waxman, manufacturers are eligible for patent term extensions. But extensions 
cannot exceed five years, and the total effective lifetime after extension cannot 
exceed fourteen years. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j), (l) (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)). 
 71.  See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–66 
(2015); Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 
§§ 4195–99 (2015); Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 803 F.3d 635 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). For discussion, see Camilla A. Hrdy, What Is Happening in Vermont? 
Patent Law Reform from the Bottom Up, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/what-is-happening-in-vermont-patent-law-
reform-from-the-bottom-up.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 72.  While we only discuss legislative acts, a plethora of judicial decisions 
affect validity. A plurality of the Supreme Court has held that the Takings 
Clause applies to judicial actions as well as legislative ones. See Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713–15 
(2010). 
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on patent value are necessarily speculative, and it is at least 
possible that the new post-issuance proceedings significantly 
devalued patents. But it cannot be denied that Dolin and Manta’s 
conclusion that the AIA effectuates a taking faces significant 
legal hurdles. Based on Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedent, patents are arguably not property under the Takings 
Clause; the AIA’s creation of IPR and CBMR proceedings is 
arguably not the kind of government action that constitutes a 
taking; and the AIA arguably did not disrupt patentees’ 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, given the 
background of federal statutes regulating patent rights and 
patented inventions. Nevertheless, the authors’ article is a 
thought-provoking and educational analysis of the constitutional 
implications of Congress’s recent efforts to reform the patent 
system.  
  
 
